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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its seventy-third
conference in Washington, D.C., on April 4 and 5, 2002. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discus-
sions presented at the conference. The first paper investigates the origins
and features of the economic boom in Ireland during the 1990s, including
the country’s rapid employment growth and apparent productivity miracle.
The second paper analyzes changes in male unemployment and labor force
participation in the United States over the last four decades, and, focus-
ing on the 1990s, shows that declining participation rates, especially for
less-skilled men, clouded their otherwise improving labor market condi-
tions. The third paper studies the interaction of ﬁrms’investments in infor-
mation technology with their investments in intangible assets such as
organizational structure, and the effect of these joint investments on ﬁrms’
market value. A report in this issue assesses the recent U.S. recession and
its ongoing recovery, reevaluates the current system for identifying reces-
sions, and considers the outlook for corporate proﬁts and equities markets.
The issue concludes with a symposium on new international arrangements
for distressed sovereign debtors. The first of the three symposium papers
argues that the problem should be addressed by replacing official lending
to developing countries with aid, forswearing multilateral bailouts of trou-
bled debtors, and placing jurisdiction over private debt disputes in the
national courts of the debtor. The second calls for broad forgiveness of
the debts of the poorest and most heavily indebted countries in the con-
text of efforts to achieve recently agreed-upon international development
goals. The third symposium paper evaluates ideas for a new sovereign
bankruptcy arrangement within the threefold broad objectives of bank-
ruptcy arrangements in general, namely, preventing a destructive race to
seize the debtor’s assets, forestalling creditors from delaying restructuring,
and allowing the debtor to make a fresh start.
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a miracle, and for understandable reasons. Early in the decade Ireland
ranked twenty-second among the world’s nations in output per capita, but
by the end of the decade it had risen to ninth. Between 1993 and 2000,
annual GDP growth averaged 9.3 percent and employment growth aver-
aged 4.8 percent. These gains contrasted sharply with the economic prob-
lems and lackluster performance of the preceding two decades, during
which unemployment rose above 15 percent, the current account deficit
grew to unsustainable levels, and government debt was rising so rapidly
that many observers feared a fiscal crisis. In the first paper of this issue,
Patrick Honohan and Brendan Walsh analyze the Irish experience and
identify a number of developments that help in understanding the boom
of the 1990s. In doing so they correct the impression that Ireland has
achieved far more rapid productivity growth than conventional models
would predict. They point out that, although the employment gains of the
boom period have been remarkable, the recorded gains in output exagger-
ate what actually happened. Under their accounting of output, no produc-
tivity miracle has accompanied Ireland’s employment gains. 
Honohan and Walsh divide the recent decades of Irish economic per-
formance into three episodes. The first, which established the initial con-
ditions for the sea change in performance that followed, started in the
mid-1970s, when a period of gradual growth was interrupted by the inﬂa-
tion and recessions triggered by the two oil price shocks. Fiscal and mon-
etary policy turned aggressively expansionary in 1977, when a new
government came to power in the midst of rising unemployment and grow-
ing labor unrest. When the government changed hands again in 1981, after
the second oil price shock, annual inﬂation had reached 21 percent, unem-
ployment had climbed to double digits, and the ﬁscal path appeared unsus-
tainable, with the deﬁcit at almost 15 percent of GDP. For the next several
years, under a series of insecure coalition governments, public services
and income support programs were maintained as unemployment contin-
ued to rise. Taxes were raised repeatedly, increasing government revenue
to almost 40 percent of GDP, up from 28 percent at the start of the 1980s.
Nonetheless, government debt continued to grow faster than GDP. The
second episode started in 1987, when a new government was able to alter
the aims of fiscal policy and win the cooperation of labor, and when
improving external conditions helped launch an economic recovery. The
third episode started in 1993, when the nascent recovery accelerated into
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analysis.
The new government that came to power in 1987 imposed new spend-
ing restraints, temporarily freezing public sector hiring and cutting gov-
ernment capital spending. No important changes were made to social
welfare or employment protection programs, which already were not par-
ticularly generous by European standards. However, the new government
did embark on a program of longer-run tax reduction, and it used the
incentive of these tax cuts in negotiations with the labor unions over wage
restraint and cooperation in avoiding work stoppages. The resulting agree-
ments ushered in a period of labor peace and wage moderation, which con-
tributed to the attractiveness of Ireland for business firms. The tax
reductions sharply raised income tax thresholds, exempting increasing
numbers of lower-paid workers from income taxes. Over 1985–2001 the
marginal tax rate on income and payroll taxes combined for a worker with
average earnings fell from 68 percent to 48 percent. The standard corpo-
rate tax rate was cut from 50 percent to 16 percent, and the capital gains
tax rate was cut from 60 percent to 20 percent. Because these tax reduc-
tions were introduced over an extended period during which economic
growth quickened and profits soared, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP
remained approximately stable between the mid-1980s and 2000. 
The authors credit these initiatives of the new government with creating
important preconditions for the expansion that started in 1987 and the
boom that eventually followed. They also credit the substantial expansion
of structural grants from the European Community; these began in 1988
and allowed a resumption of public capital spending, which had been post-
poned in the initial fiscal tightening. But the authors reject the “expan-
sionary ﬁscal contraction” model that some observers have offered: unlike
in that model, Ireland’s expansion after 1986 was not led by lower inter-
est rates and rising investment. Rather it was led by exports and consump-
tion, whose growth the authors attribute to rapid economic expansion
among Ireland’s trading partners, wage moderation, the devaluation of
1986, and labor peace, which cut days lost to industrial disputes after 1995
to 20 percent of the 1970–85 average. The transformation of the expansion
into an outright boom was marked initially by a renewed surge in exports,
aided by a further devaluation in early 1993, and by a surge in residential
construction. Eventually an acceleration in consumer spending paralleled
the rapid rise in disposable incomes. And, in the last years of the decade,
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sharply. 
The remarkable rise in employment during the boom years reduced the
unemployment rate below 4 percent in 2001. But this improvement 
is only a small part of the employment story. Between 1991 and 2001,
nonagricultural employment rose by 667,000, or 31 percent of the 1991
working-age population. The healthy job market supported net inward
migration of 110,000 over that period, compared with outmigration of
125,000 in the preceding five years. The total working-age population
rose by 400,000. The authors turn to a sectoral breakdown to identify
where the jobs were created. Between 1985 and 2000 the fastest-growing
industry was building and construction, which accounted for 16 percent
of the total employment gain, and the second-fastest-growing was high-
technology manufacturing—electronics, pharmaceuticals, and medical
instrumentation—which accounted for 13 percent of the gain. Market ser-
vices, which ranges from financial and legal services to restaurants and
hotels, was the third-fastest-growing sector and, because of its size,
accounted for 54 percent of the total gain. The relatively modest employ-
ment contribution of high-technology manufacturing, which is dominated
by foreign firms and where much foreign investment is concentrated, con-
trasts with the common observation that foreign investment has been the
key to the Irish resurgence. 
The contribution of foreign firms to the economy’s measured output is
markedly greater than their contribution to employment. Honohan and
Walsh analyze why this is so and how it distorts the aggregate growth sta-
tistics for Ireland. They observe that Ireland has become almost an entre-
pôt economy in some of its manufacturing industries that are dominated by
multinational corporations. In their most extreme example, the industry
that produces pharmaceutical chemicals accounted for just over 0.3 per-
cent of total employment in 1999, yet its value added amounted to 8
1⁄2 per-
cent of GDP, implying a net output per worker of $2
1⁄2 million. Other
industries with strikingly low labor shares include those dominated by
the manufacture of soft drink concentrates and the reproduction of soft-
ware. All these industries produce patented products whose value derives
largely from research and development done by the parent firm and from
inputs imported from the parent or its other affiliates. Ireland’s low cor-
porate proﬁts tax encourages multinationals to set intraﬁrm transfer prices
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land, and thus the value added attributed to Ireland. 
The authors show that such effects are large enough to meaningfully
distort the aggregate data on output and, hence, on productivity. They
estimate that GDP in 1999 would have been 15 percent lower than the ofﬁ-
cial figure if the output of just four industries dominated by multination-
als were valued in a manner consistent with the average labor productivity
of corresponding industries in other European countries. Although this
adjustment is very crude, alternative adjustments tell a similar story.
Ireland’s GNP, which omits the proﬁts of foreign-owned ﬁrms operating in
the country (but is also affected by variations in the net interest payments
to foreigners on government debt), is well below its GDP and grew sig-
niﬁcantly less than GDP during the 1990s. And a measure of GDP adjusted
to omit the proﬁts of multinationals grew less than unadjusted GDP. When
productivity growth is calculated using this last adjustment, the produc-
tivity miracle in Ireland’s official statistics vanishes. For the period
1995–2000, when official GDP per worker rose at a 4.7 percent annual
rate, adjusted GDP per worker rose at a 2.3 percent rate, not far from
Ireland’s long-term average, and not far from productivity growth rates
experienced in other countries during this period.
Honohan and Walsh stress that Ireland’s performance has been out-
standing even after correcting away the productivity miracle in the offi-
cial statistics. Even by their adjusted output measures, GDP per capita
soared in the 1990s. It rose at a 4.7 percent annual rate over the decade as
a whole and at a 6.3 percent annual rate during 1995–2000. In contrast, it
had been essentially ﬂat during 1980–85 and had risen at a 3.1 percent rate
during the 1970s. By 2000 the level of adjusted GDP per capita had con-
verged to the average in the European Union. 
The U.S. economic expansion of the 1990S brought with it a dramatic
decline in unemployment. As the unemployment rate fell below 6 per-
cent, many economists expected inﬂation to accelerate and recommended
tightening monetary policy. Yet by the end of the decade unemployment
had fallen to 4 percent with scarcely any sign of inflationary pressures.
Economists who believe in the NAIRU were at first skeptical that any
change had occurred in the relationship between labor market tightness
and inﬂation, but by the end of the period many had substantially lowered
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in the labor market that might account for the change. Eleven years ago
Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Murphy, and Robert Topel presented a Brookings
Paper titled “Why Has the Natural Rate of Unemployment Increased over
Time?” They documented the dramatic rise in unemployment and in non-
participation in the labor force among prime-aged males between 1967
and 1989, and they concluded that structural factors had dramatically
reduced the prospects for a return to low rates of joblessness in the near
future. In the second paper of this issue, these same authors use their orig-
inal framework to reexamine the labor market after the long expansion of
the 1990s.
The authors use data for 1967 through 2000 obtained from the annual
supplement to the March Current Population Survey. The supplement
identiﬁes certain personal and household characteristics of the respondents
and provides information on their labor market outcomes during the pre-
vious year. For each individual these include the number of unemployment
spells and the number of weeks spent employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force. The survey also includes questions about earnings and hours
worked, which the authors use to calculate average hourly wages. As in
their earlier paper, the authors confine their analysis to men with one to
thirty years of potential labor market experience, to avoid the complex
issues concerning women’s labor force participation and the issues asso-
ciated with early retirement and pensions. They avoid other measurement
problems by excluding men who spent part of the year in school or in
military service. The authors express rates of unemployment, nonemploy-
ment, and nonparticipation as fractions of this population and calculate
them as the number of weeks a year spent in each of those three states
divided by fifty-two and averaged over the population. They show that
the trend and cycles of annual unemployment rates calculated from these
data closely track those of the familiar unemployment rate based on the
monthly household survey for the entire population, although the means of
the two series differ over the period. 
The authors’1991 paper reported that the long-term trend in unem-
ployment rates understated the growth in joblessness because labor force
participation had declined. They now show that the rise in nonparticipation
continued during the 1990s despite the shift from rising to declining unem-
ployment. As a result, the nonemployment rate, which is the sum of the
unemployment rate and the nonparticipation rate, ended the decade
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entire sample period, the unemployment rate ended the 1990s only 0.8 per-
centage point above its level in the extremely tight labor market of the
late 1960s, but the nonemployment rate was nearly 5 percentage points
higher. 
To further examine the growth in nonemployment, the authors look at
changes in its concentration and at reasons for joblessness. They show that,
between the late 1960s and the late 1990s, the amount of joblessness
accounted for by those working at least part of the year was little changed,
whereas the amount accounted for by those who did not work at all rose
from 1.8 percent to 6.1 percent of the population. The fraction of total
joblessness experienced by those who did not work at all during the year
had been rising steadily over this long period and accelerated during the
last decade. The authors find that those reporting being ill or disabled
accounted for 0.8 percentage point out of the 1.9-percentage-point rise in
labor force nonparticipation since 1982–83, when this category began
expanding noticeably. The ill or disabled were relatively even more impor-
tant in accounting for full-year joblessness. The authors cite other
researchers who have identified effects on participation rates stemming
from legislative and administrative changes in disability beneﬁt programs,
and they note that eligibility standards for these programs were substan-
tially liberalized in 1984.
The authors devise a model that allows them to estimate the flow rates
into and out of unemployment (or nonemployment) that would have kept
it constant at each year’s observed level. Using these estimated flow pa-
rameters, they then calculate the steady-state values of average spells and
durations of both unemployment and nonemployment for each year. They
find that over their sample period the average duration of unemployment
spells estimated in this way doubled, from 2.1 months to 4.2 months, while
the entry rate into unemployment declined to 0.7 percent a month from
1.1 percent a month. Before the recession of 1991–92, cyclical ﬂuctuations
in unemployment and nonemployment were driven almost equally by
changes in both the incidence and the duration of spells. But rising inci-
dence played a minor role in that recession, whereas durations rose
sharply, and the long decline in unemployment that followed was driven
mainly by a reduced probability of becoming unemployed. The authors
observe that, with fewer but longer spells, the distribution of unemploy-
ment across the population is much more concentrated today than in the
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ment spells has also grown steadily, reaching 15.1 months, while the prob-
ability of becoming jobless has fallen below its level in the tight labor
markets of the late 1960s. 
Dividing their sample into percentile groups of the wage distribution,
which they take as a proxy for skill groups, the authors show that the labor
market experience across these groups has varied widely. Before 1989,
both unemployment and nonparticipation rose the most in the lowest wage
group. This trend was reversed during the 1990s: the lowest wage group
saw unemployment fall the most and nonparticipation rise the least,
although these reversals did not fully undo the changes of the two previous
decades. For workers near the median of the wage distribution (percentiles
41 to 60), unemployment was up only slightly over the entire period, but
nonparticipation rose 2.6 percentage points, and thus nonemployment rose
3 percentage points. Over the entire period nonparticipation and nonem-
ployment rose for all percentile groups; this rise was greatest for the least-
skilled workers and smaller for each successively higher skill group.
Women’s labor force participation and wages have generally risen over
the entire period from the 1960s to the present. Might the long-term
declines in men’s labor force participation and employment rates reﬂect a
shift in their labor supply in response to the improved labor market oppor-
tunities of their wives? The authors examine this hypothesis and reject it.
For their entire sample of men, they show that the long drift upward in
nonparticipation and nonemployment is concentrated among men with-
out a working wife. They also show that among less-skilled men (those in
the 1st to the 40th percentile of the wage distribution), who experienced
the largest increases in joblessness, the percentage with a working wife
actually declined over time, as declining marriage rates more than offset
rising women’s participation. For these men, average real household
income increased only slightly after the early 1970s, when the trend
toward rising wage inequality for the less skilled started. In contrast, for
men above the 60th wage percentile, whose participation rates were nearly
stable, the share of households with working wives rose through the late
1980s and then leveled off, and their household incomes rose rapidly. 
The authors’preferred explanation for the nonemployment patterns they
describe relies on the movements of real wages and employment of dif-
ferent skill groups over their long sample period. Over this period, and
most clearly from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, the largest increases
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among less-skilled men. As in their earlier paper, the authors interpret
this as showing that declining rewards to work caused less-skilled workers
to choose to work less. Their worsening relative wages and low relative
employment rates are both the result of a shift in demand away from this
group of workers. The authors estimate labor supply elasticities from
cross-sectional data for the early 1970s and late 1980s and use them to pre-
dict the change in nonemployment during the 1990s for different wage
percentile groups. These estimates show that the employment rates of less-
skilled workers are more responsive to changes in wages than those of
other workers. For this group of workers, whose real wages rose during the
1990s after nearly two decades of decline, the equations correctly predict
a decline in nonemployment, although they substantially underestimate its
size. The authors also observe that the recovery in employment for these
workers preceded the recovery in their wages, which did not start until
the middle of the decade. They judge that the estimated model works rea-
sonably well over long periods but is less successful in predicting the
short-run dynamics of the labor market. 
The authors conclude that their basic framework, in which labor sup-
ply responds to shifts in demand, continues to usefully predict labor mar-
ket outcomes. They also conclude that wage developments, together with
the expansion of disability payments, which improves the attractiveness of
nonemployment, are the key to the observed movements in nonparticipa-
tion and joblessness. The authors point to the reversal during the last half
of the 1990s of previous wage and employment trends for the least-skilled
men as evidence that growth in inequality may have run its course. But
they see the continuing decline in labor force participation among these
men as an ongoing problem. Because an important proportion of these
men have withdrawn from the labor market for what the authors determine
to be demand-related reasons, their assessment of the labor market outlook
for less-skilled men is “rather grim.”
During the 1980S, AS FIRMS INCREASINGLY introduced computers into
their operations, the failure of productivity to grow faster was puzzling. A
decade later productivity growth had ﬁnally quickened, and analysts today
are trying to pin down what ﬁnally made the difference. In the technology-
producing industries themselves, productivity had been rising all along,
and at very rapid rates. But the technology sector was initially far too small
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xvii
0675-00a  BPEA  Editors  Sum    7/22/02    1:15  PM    Page  xviito have a large effect on aggregate productivity, and even by the end of
the 1990s it could account for only a modest portion of the faster growth in
the aggregate. It was apparent that productivity was rising faster in the
broader economy as well, and researchers have been trying to determine
why. In the third paper of this issue, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin Hitt, and
Shinkyu Yang present an empirical model that extends work they and oth-
ers have pioneered in which the interaction of investments in information
technology (IT) and intangible capital is the key to firms’productivity
improvement. As they see it, early business applications of computers
typically aimed to substitute computers for low-skilled labor. More recent
applications have used IT to facilitate the redesign of ﬁrms’production and
distribution systems, making IT investment complementary with invest-
ment in such organizational assets and greatly enhancing productivity in
those ﬁrms that successfully combine the two. 
The authors review recent research that explores the importance of
organizational changes for increased productivity; this research includes
case studies of conspicuously successful firms as well as econometric
research that has documented the complementarity between IT and work
organization. They note that organizational assets or their effects can be
observed in more than one way. Some organizational changes can be
observed directly or through surveys. The enhanced real returns provided
by efficiently combining IT investments with organizational changes
should be measurable as higher subsequent output than can be accounted
for by conventional returns to capital and labor. And the expected future
effect of such IT-driven combinations should be promptly reflected in the
investing firm’s market valuation. In the present paper, the authors focus
mainly on this third type of evidence, attempting to estimate the effect of
IT investment and investment in organizational changes on the market val-
ues of individual ﬁrms over the 1987–97 period. 
The authors’basic model follows standard finance theory and recent
research by Robert Hall in relating the market value of the firm to the
capital goods it owns, where capital goods are broadly defined to include
all assets of the ﬁrm, including accumulated intangible assets. The authors
show that optimizing managers will invest in such a way that the market
value of the firm, defined as the value of common and preferred stock
plus total debt, will equal the sum of the values of its assets. In an esti-
mating equation relating a firm’s market value to its assets, if all assets
are accounted for and there are no adjustment costs, the expected coeffi-
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assets will bias the coefficients on those assets upward. And, most impor-
tant, if some assets are omitted from the equation, a coefficient greater
than 1 will be expected on those assets that are positively correlated with
the omitted assets. The authors use these propositions in interpreting their
results. 
Their overall data set is a panel of 1,216 firms for which they have
annual market values of the firm and values of computer capital, other
physical plant and equipment (PP&E), and other noncash balance sheet
assets. Because not all ﬁrms are in the sample in each year of their eleven-
year sample period, this data set contains 7,564 observations. In compiling
the data, the authors omitted firms that principally produce computers or
software, firms in the communications sector, and firms for which data
are inconsistent from year to year. For 272 of their 1,216 firms they also
have data on organizational practices, distilled from a series of surveys of
large ﬁrms taken in late 1995 and early 1996. These provide 2,097 obser-
vations over the sample period. With these data, the authors construct a
proxy for organizational assets for these 272 large ﬁrms that permits them
to examine interactions with the ﬁrm’s IT capital more explicitly. 
The authors ﬁrst report on a range of pooled regressions explaining the
market value of a ﬁrm by the value of its assets. Because many ﬁrms with
different sampling frequencies are pooled over eleven years, in these and
their other regressions they include dummy variables for each year and
for each industry represented in the sample. Ordinary least squares regres-
sions give a coefﬁcient of 1.5 on each dollar of installed PP&E other than
computers, a coefficient of 12 on each dollar of computer assets, and a
coefﬁcient of 1 on other assets. These values indicate that computer assets,
and to a lesser degree PP&E, are subject to adjustment costs or are corre-
lated with assets that are omitted from the regressions. The authors suspect
that adjustment costs explain the moderately high PP&E coefficient, but
that correlation with omitted variables accounts for the extremely high
coefficient on computers. Results with some alternative estimation tech-
niques do not dislodge these basic results. Using a least absolute devia-
tion regression, which minimizes the importance of outliers, reduces the
PP&E coefficient but has little effect on the computer coefficient. When
the equations are run on the same variables in difference form, with the
difference taken over intervals ranging from one to ten years, the results
are harder to interpret. For one- and two-year differences, the coefficient
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surement problems, but for differences of four years or longer the coeffi-
cient becomes comparable to those in the regressions using levels of the
variables. Year-by-year cross-sectional regressions also give large values
for the computer coefﬁcients. 
To further explore their hypothesis that these large coefficients repre-
sent a correlation of computer assets with changing organizational assets
in ﬁrms, the authors construct a composite index for the presence of orga-
nizational assets, ORG, from several measures of organizational structure
obtained from the mid-1990s surveys described above. These measures fall
within four broad categories: structural decentralization of decisionmak-
ing, individual decentralization, team incentives, and skill acquisition. In
pooled regressions similar to their ﬁrst set, but with the smaller sample of
272 firms for which they have data to construct ORG, the authors show
that, when ORG is interacted with each of the asset variables and the inter-
action variables are added to the regressions along with the asset variables,
only the interaction with computer assets is large and statistically signifi-
cant, and the coefficient on computer assets alone remains well above 1.
The authors interpret these results as suggesting that firms with large
investments in computers have disproportionately large amounts of intan-
gible organizational assets and that the interaction of the two is the main
factor accounting for the high coefficient estimates on computers in their
market value regressions. To support their market value results, they also
regress firms’output on their previous inputs of capital and labor, along
with their computer assets, ORG, and the interaction of the two. The coef-
ficients on these last three variables are positive for outputs ranging from
zero to three years following the corresponding inputs, a result the authors
interpret as indicating the positive contribution of these variables to multi-
factor productivity. 
Although all the results are consistent with the authors’hypotheses
about how computers interact with changes in firms’ organization to
enhance market values and future productivity, some participants at the
conference, whose remarks appear in the comments and general discussion
following the paper, stressed that econometric difficulties left the inter-
pretation of the results uncertain. Nonetheless, the authors believe they
have identified the presence of some firms that have harnessed computer
technology to reﬁne their business organization in a way that creates spe-
cial value. Although they regard their present attempts as only a start at
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make for greater efficiency, they believe they have established the impor-
tance of those practices and technologies for the acceleration in produc-
tivity that has occurred.
A great deal has changed on the U.S. economic scene in the past two
years. The historic collapse of the NASDAQ bubble and substantial
decline of the broader stock market were the most conspicuous event.
The economy itself moved from a rapid expansion to a mild recession. And
corporate profits as reported by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), which had
boomed during most of the 1990s, weakened disproportionately after the
end of the decade. In a report in this issue, William Nordhaus provides a
provocative discussion of these developments and of what they portend for
the economic expansion and the stock market going forward.
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) is the official arbiter of when recessions in the
United States start and end. Nordhaus argues that the committee should
provide a much richer classification of recessions than it now does, one
that would reflect the severity of downturns as well as their presence. He
compares movements in four broad measures of economic loss—declines
in real GDP, declines in nonfarm employment, increases in unemploy-
ment, and positive output gaps—both to see how the periods of weakness
they identify compare with the ten postwar recessions identified by the
NBER and to show how much recessions vary in severity. Periods when
the two-quarter average of real GDP has declined coincide with every
postwar recession identified by the NBER and show no false positives.
However, the recent recession, which Nordhaus assumes had its trough in
the fourth quarter of 2001, barely qualiﬁes as a recession by this measure.
Periods when the two-quarter average of private nonfarm employment
declines also match every postwar recession; by this measure the latest
episode appears more clearly as a downturn but is tied with the 1970 reces-
sion for the mildest of the ten. Periods of four-quarter increases in the
unemployment rate also match all recessions but produce several small
false positives compared with NBER dating. By this measure the last two
recessions have been the mildest. Finally, the output gap, which Nord-
haus calculates as the percentage difference between actual and potential
GDP (the latter as estimated by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, or CBO),
is the least correlated of the four with NBER recession timing. It provides
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxi
0675-00a BPEA Editors Sum  7/22/02  1:15 PM  Page xxia measure of cumulative economic loss, but its accuracy depends on how
accurately potential output is estimated. Nordhaus observes that, by the
CBO’s estimate, the economy remained near its potential at the trough of
the last recession.
To go beyond simple recession dating, which does not distinguish
between the last, very mild recession and a much deeper contraction like
that in 1982 or even 1933, Nordhaus proposes classifying downturns
according to a scale like that used for hurricanes, with categories ranging
from I (a pause in economic growth) to V (a depression). He then offers the
following tentative rankings of specific historical episodes based on the
size and duration of declines in output and employment, gaps in output,
and increases in unemployment. The depression of the 1930s is a full-
blown category V. The ﬁrst nine postwar NBER recessions range from cat-
egory II, a mild downturn, to category IV, a deep and prolonged recession.
And their number declines to eight, because he counts the 1980–82 period
as a single downturn. Nordhaus classifies the 2001 recession and the soft
quarters in 1963 and 1967, two episodes that the NBER did not identify
as recessions, as category I events.
Several comprehensive measures of corporate profits are available for
the U.S. economy: S&P operating profits and reported profits, both on an
after-tax basis, and profits in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA), which are available both before and after taxes and with and with-
out adjustments for capital consumption and inventory valuation. All these
measures display much the same broad pattern from 1990 to the present,
rising during the long expansion and declining sharply when the expansion
faltered. However, they depart importantly from each other both in the
magnitude and in the timing of these swings. Nordhaus discusses the dif-
ferences in coverage, definitions, and data sources among the series but
observes that these differences do not readily account for the recent dis-
crepancies. After-tax NIPA proﬁts peaked in 1997, whereas both operating
and reported S&P profits climbed sharply for three more years. The sub-
sequent decline in reported S&P profits was especially severe. Nordhaus
discusses a variety of accounting irregularities—what he calls “Not Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles”—that have been reported in the
press for individual ﬁrms. These include swapping capital assets and cap-
italizing the outﬂow while recognizing the inﬂow currently, booking pen-
sion fund returns as current income, and recording sales of products still in
research. And he reasons that such accounting contaminated the aggre-
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subsequent decline.
Nordhaus obtains a more realistic estimate of recent S&P earnings by
regressing the logarithm of historical S&P reported earnings on the loga-
rithm of historical unadjusted NIPA earnings, a cyclical variable, and a
constant. He then uses predicted values from this equation in an attempt
to correct reported recent S&P earnings for accounting tricks and the
cycle. And he projects these corrected earnings for the period 2001:4
through 2002:4 by assuming that GDP grows 0.5 percentage point faster
than potential. By this procedure he estimates that S&P earnings in 2001
were depressed by 30 percent for cyclical and accounting reasons, and that
earnings in 2002:4 will be 55 percent higher than their uncorrected level in
2001:4.
Turning to prospects for the stock market, Nordhaus presents a model
that relates prospective stock returns to current earnings-price ratios and
safe real bond yields. Under strong assumptions about the expected returns
to tangible and intangible assets, the earnings-price ratio, corrected for
temporary cyclical swings in earnings, provides an estimate of expected
real returns on equities. And the difference between that expected return
and the safe real bond yield, which he calls the equity spread, should reﬂect
the systematic risk of equities. Nordhaus shows that even his corrected
S&P earnings measure currently produces an equity spread that is very
near zero. Because he sees the prospects for economic expansion as limited
by the fact that the economy was near its potential at the end of 2001, he
judges the chances for a major change in the spread to be limited as well.
Slow growth would keep proﬁts from rising sharply, and if growth should
quicken relative to potential, it would invite higher interest rates. With
this economic outlook, and with stocks still overvalued relative to their
long history, Nordhaus is not optimistic about the outlook for equities.
The frequent sovereign debt crises that have plagued international
capital markets, and the controversy that has often attended their resolu-
tion, have led to ongoing research and debate about how the international
financial system and its institutions might be improved. That debate cen-
ters on such issues as the efficiency with which capital is allocated, the
economic and political instability that crises bring, and the fairness of the
outcomes for both creditors and debtors. Recently, both John Taylor of
the U.S. Treasury and Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund
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debate and rekindled interest in formalizing bankruptcy procedures for
sovereign debt. In at least one of its versions, Krueger’s proposal would
make provisions for countries to file for bankruptcy and would give the
IMF a central role in granting countries permission to file, in supervising
their performance, and in assessing their progress on reforms, as well as
continue the IMF’s existing role in providing new loans to countries in dis-
tress. Taylor’s proposal, in contrast, takes a contractual approach to the
problem, avoiding formal bankruptcy proceedings altogether. His proposal
relies on changing the form of sovereign debt contracts so as to deﬁne the
rights of all creditors and debtors in the event of a default. And, to further
the inclusion of such provisions in future sovereign debt contracts, Taylor
proposes that the IMF require their incorporation by any country under
an IMF rescue program, or that it reward countries that incorporate the
provisions voluntarily by reducing the interest rate on their borrowings
from the IMF. In the next three papers in this issue, presented as part of a
symposium on international bankruptcy arrangements at the Brookings
Panel meeting, Jeremy Bulow, Jeffrey Sachs, and Michelle White address
both the broad issue of reforming the present system and the particular
proposals offered by Taylor and Krueger. Three shorter discussion papers,
by Nouriel Roubini, Hal Scott, and Edwin Truman, reflect on these sym-
posium papers and provide additional analysis.
In the first of the three symposium papers, Jeremy Bulow briefly
addresses the recent proposals for international bankruptcy arrangements
before turning to his own, more sweeping recommendations for change.
Bulow ﬁnds Taylor’s proposal that all new sovereign debt contracts contain
collective action clauses a modest step in the right direction. It recognizes
that sovereign debt is now widely held by a variety of market participants
rather than by a few major banks, and it would reduce the costs and com-
plications of bankruptcy that arise in such an environment. And, by requir-
ing such clauses in all new sovereign debt, it would eliminate the adverse
selection that would result if individual countries imposed such provisions
on their own initiative: such a move might signal a greater likelihood of
future default, thus raising borrowing costs for those countries. However,
Bulow also points to what he sees as a weakness of Taylor’s proposal:
because a single sovereign may have many different issues and types of
debt outstanding at a given time, the holders of one issue or type could
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Krueger’s proposal avoids this weakness by subjecting all debt to the same
procedure, which the IMF or some other international body would initiate.
Under this plan, a temporary stay of payments to all creditors would pro-
vide time to restructure all debt in a manner agreeable to a supermajority
of creditors. However, the plan still leaves room for substantive disagree-
ments among different classes of creditors, and this would invite lengthy
negotiations. It would also leave much sovereign debt under the jurisdic-
tion of first world legal structures, which means that a country’s foreign
debt would not be handled together with domestic claims. Bulow also
notes that both the Taylor and the Krueger plans would leave the interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), as well as ﬁrst world courts, in the mid-
dle of any debt negotiations. Because debt negotiations by their nature
involve transferring resources from debtors to first world creditors, he
reasons that these institutions, which are effectively controlled by first
world countries, should be as removed from these negotiations as possible.
Bulow observes that the presence of the IFIs, which are in effect sov-
ereign creditors with a role and status that differ from those of private cred-
itors, complicates the sovereign debt market. He illustrates this complexity
by considering how the presence of the IFIs inﬂuences the market for pri-
vate lending to governments and what this implies for the seniority of dif-
ferent forms of debt—such an assessment of seniority is the conventional
way of thinking about who loses the most in a debt restructuring. Knowing
that IFIs exist as a probable source of bailout funds, private lenders and
sovereign borrowers may engage in more and larger debt transactions with
each other than is economically efﬁcient. That outcome is consistent with
IFI loans being effectively junior to private loans in this environment,
whatever their legal designation. Yet to date hardly any debt to the IMF or
the World Bank has ultimately defaulted, whereas private creditors have
often restructured at a loss. This ambiguity about true seniority arises from
the uncertain and ad hoc response of the IFIs to recurring crises.
Bulow’s own policy recommendations follow on those that he and Ken-
neth Rogoff have previously offered. They would cut through the existing
ambiguities by fundamentally changing the international ﬁnancial regime
as it interacts with developing nations. Bulow proposes replacing all IFI
loans with aid, leaving lending to the private sector, and shifting all liti-
gation and enforcement of loans to debtor-country courts. Because official
loans to developing countries today are a bundle of loans and subsidies,
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more rational and equitable allocation of aid. In this connection, a spe-
cific benefit of aid grants is that they can be directed to nongovernmental
organizations as well as to governments and thus better targeted to partic-
ular projects and goals. Allowing the IFIs to escape from debt renegotia-
tions would be a further benefit of moving from loans to aid. Bulow also
notes that both the IMF and the World Bank manage to keep their true
finances out of the budgets of the United States and the other govern-
ments that support them, and that more transparent accounting for aid
would lead to its more efficient deployment and possibly to its enlarge-
ment. In an accounting sense, since its inception in 1944 the World Bank
has only “cost” the United States $2 billion, which is the capital it has paid
in. In total, the Bank’s paid-in capital is less than $12 billion, but it has a
subscribed capital of $190 billion and $115 billion in loans outstanding. In
effect, the U.S. government implicitly guarantees about $30 billion in
developing country debt. The IMF’s accounting is even murkier. The
United States’ quota with the IMF has no impact on the U.S. budget,
because it is offset by a credit in the form of reserves held with the IMF.
Yet the amount of IMF lending is widely reported during times of crisis.
Bulow believes that more transparent accounting might actually lead to
larger amounts of ongoing aid, because U.S. taxpayers presently overesti-
mate the extent of foreign aid their government provides.
Bulow favors moving jurisdiction over sovereign debt to the debtor’s
courts on grounds that directly challenge an important justiﬁcation for pre-
sent arrangements, namely, that making debts enforceable in the creditors’
countries encourages lending by ﬁrst world creditors. Stressing the moral
hazard argument, Bulow maintains that this results in excessive and inef-
ficient lending. The favorable effects he sees from moving jurisdiction
include the incentives it would provide for countries to invest in sound proj-
ects with a high likelihood of success, and the disincentives it would pro-
vide to lending to corrupt governments that would fail to use the proceeds
productively. He also sees this change as leveling the playing ﬁeld between
foreign and domestic debt and between debt and equity investments.
Although he concedes that his proposal might make international capital
markets resemble those in the 1950–75 period, when almost all private
inflows to developing nations were in the form of direct and equity port-
folio investment, he reasons that the growth rates of developing countries
provide little evidence that the earlier period produced worse results.
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Bank out of the bailout business. In developing countries, the staffs of
these organizations are widely seen as working for the rich creditor coun-
tries, and consequently their recommendations and the conditions on lend-
ing they impose are viewed with suspicion. If the IFIs themselves were not
creditors, he reasons, their professional staffs would more likely be viewed
as honest brokers whose information and advice are sought by all sides.
Bulow suggests that shifting the IFIs’expertise into making project grants
would improve the effectiveness of the aid component of their present loan
operations. And he reasons that losing the ability to impose macroeco-
nomic adjustment plans, which now accompany loan programs, would
not be costly, because in the reformed environment countries would them-
selves want to pursue macroeconomic policies that attract capital.
Jeffrey Sachs focuses on the particular problems that confront the
most heavily indebted poor countries. He observes that foreign debt prob-
lems have never been handled through a system of well-established rules.
During the age of imperialism and right up to the Great Depression, cred-
itors often resorted to force or the threat of force in their dealings with
debtor countries. Since World War II, debt crises have been worked out
in negotiations between debtor nations and creditors, often with the
engagement of international institutions such as the IMF in which credi-
tor interests predominate. Sachs argues that, as the result of such ad hoc
negotiations, debtor countries have often been locked into long-term
instability and profound poverty, effectively losing their sovereignty to
the IMF and the World Bank. Meanwhile the bailouts of private lenders
by IFIs have raised the moral hazard of indiscriminate future lending in
the expectation of future bailouts.
To illustrate the problem confronting poor countries, Sachs outlines a
model of the poverty traps into which such countries can fall as the result
of an excessive foreign debt burden. The model’s central point is that pos-
itive growth requires positive saving, and that the difference between for-
eign aid and foreign debt service costs is critical to whether poor countries
can achieve positive saving. Sachs shows that, after the mid-1970s, a num-
ber of the poorest countries were squeezed between declining real aid per
capita and rising debt burdens. Although their official bilateral debt has
been repeatedly restructured through deliberations in the Paris Club
(whose members include the principal creditor governments), relief was
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until 1988, the present value of their debt was not reduced at all. Using a
three-way classification of fifty-nine debtor nations that underwent Paris
Club restructuring during 1975–96, Sachs finds that only nine have been
“cured” of their unsustainable debt burdens, and only one of those, Equa-
torial Guinea, which discovered massive offshore oil reserves, was among
the poorest countries in the group at the outset. Thirty-nine countries,
including all of those initially among the poorest, remain in “chronic cri-
sis” today. These countries achieved a median per capita annual growth
rate of only 0.3 percent during the 1990s. The remaining twelve countries
are “in remission”: they are current on their debt service and have seen
recent improvement in their economic and financial conditions but con-
tinue to have IMF programs in place.
Sachs’proposals for reforming the debt relief process for poor countries
are informed by what he sees as the two distinct motivations of bankruptcy
law in general. The ﬁrst is to avoid a creditor “grab race” that could under-
mine the value of the assets of an insolvent debtor, to the detriment of both
debtor and creditors. The second is to provide a fresh start to insolvent
debtors. Sachs notes that U.S. bankruptcy law deals with both these prob-
lems, although corporations can ultimately be forced into liquidation,
whereas municipalities and individuals are assured of a fresh start by the
protection of important assets and of future income. In the context of sov-
ereign debt, collective action to avoid the creditor grab race is the most
pressing issue for middle-income debtor countries, whereas for poor coun-
tries the need for a fresh start is even more important. Sachs argues that
past programs for dealing with the debt of heavily indebted poor coun-
tries have been based on changing criteria, which have not been tailored
to the situations of individual countries and have ignored their need for a
fresh start.
To replace the ad hoc methods of the past, Sachs suggests a program
with five specific elements aimed at granting a fresh start based on each
country’s specific needs and at providing incentives for the debtor coun-
tries to meet certain well-defined goals. For this purpose he uses the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were endorsed by all members
of the United Nations in September 2000. First, debt restructuring should
be consistent with a framework in which the debtor countries can achieve
the MDGs. Second, in exchange for debt relief, each heavily indebted poor
country should be required to prepare medium-term plans for achieving
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the key U.N. agencies and the IFIs should support countries in formulating
these plans and include them in their own country strategy plans. Fourth,
an independent review panel, chosen by but not representing either debtors
or creditors, should make recommendations on the scale of debt cancella-
tion and increased foreign assistance for each country, based on its indi-
vidual circumstances. Fifth, the United Nations and the IFIs should
publish yearly updates on each country’s progress toward the MDGs.
Sachs predicts that the assessments that would result from such a pro-
gram would call for a complete cancellation of debt for most heavily
indebted poor countries and an increase in the foreign assistance provided
to them. Although the program would be merely advisory, he is hopeful
that its transparency and objectivity would highlight the inadequacy of
the creditor-dominated approach of the past and call attention to the need
for vastly larger resource transfers from the rich countries to the poor. 
In the third paper of the symposium, Michelle White examines pro-
posals for a sovereign bankruptcy procedure, using as a framework several
broad goals that any procedure for restructuring of distressed foreign debt
should aim to achieve. These goals include a quick and orderly restruc-
turing, because delay hurts both a debtor country’s economy and credi-
tors generally; rules that deal with the collective action problem by
preventing individual lawsuits against the debtor and compelling rogue
creditors to accept a restructuring plan; and arrangements that allow the
debtor to obtain new loans as soon as possible following a default. With
these goals in mind, White examines how experience with U.S. bankruptcy
law can guide the design of a sovereign bankruptcy plan. She also con-
siders whether alternative proposals for reform, such as those recently
offered by Taylor and Krueger, are preferable to a reform that creates an
international court to oversee sovereign bankruptcy.
White reviews three relevant sections of the U.S. bankruptcy code:
Chapter 7, which deals with bankruptcy liquidation for corporations and
individuals; Chapter 11, which deals with corporate reorganization; and
Chapter 9, which deals with municipal bankruptcy. She reasons that a
sovereign bankruptcy arrangement that paralleled Chapter 7’s treatment of
individual debt would provide a useful backstop if a restructuring plan
could not be agreed to. Like individual bankruptcy liquidation, which
exempts certain of the debtor’s assets and any postbankruptcy earnings,
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nity (including assets held within the debtor country and diplomatic assets
abroad), discharge debts not covered by liquidation of nonexempt com-
mercial assets, and exempt any future revenue from seizure by creditors.
White next discusses several aspects of corporate reorganization under
Chapter 11 and calls special attention to the features that help the corpo-
ration survive. She observes that such features involve an important trade-
off. Because Chapter 11 allows them to retain control and equity remains
intact, managers have an incentive to reorganize the ﬁrm under Chapter 11
rather than engage in activities that may be destructive to the firm in an
attempt to avoid bankruptcy. But managers also have an incentive to file
for reorganization in order to reduce debt burdens even if the company is
in fact solvent and could pay off its debtors in full. She suggests that a par-
allel trade-off applies to sovereign default. During the East Asian crisis,
ofﬁcials in several countries went to great lengths to avoid running out of
foreign exchange, in the process causing deep recessions; thus there may
have been too few defaults in that episode. But theory also suggests that
countries may borrow too much and then default if the penalties for doing
so are not severe enough. Finally, turning to Chapter 9, White notes that
although the sovereign status of municipalities gives this chapter relevance
for international debts, there have been too few municipal defaults in the
United States to provide useful lessons of how it works in practice.
White then reviews recent experience with sovereign debt crises and the
role that international institutions have played. She observes that the grow-
ing importance of foreign bonds with their widely fragmented ownership
has made debt restructuring increasingly difficult and has put increased
pressure on the IMF to bail out countries in financial distress, which, in
turn, has led to the recent IMF and Treasury proposals for reforming the
process. White discusses in detail how these and related proposals could be
expected to affect the sovereign debt market and to what extent they
address the goals that a good debt restructuring mechanism should aim for.
She concludes that contractual approaches like the Treasury’s, which rely
on collective action clauses, are unlikely to reach the desired goals. It is
difﬁcult to prevent creditors from circumventing their restrictions and from
interfering with debtors’ability to obtain new private loans. She finds the
IMF proposal more promising. She notes that it adopts many features of
Chapter 9 and Chapter 11, and that it addresses the collective action prob-
lem and the need for debtors to maintain access to new loans. However, the
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an international court to adjudicate bankruptcy procedures; this would
require legal changes by a large number of countries. Without such a court,
White reasons, the proposal would be difficult to implement. She also
warns that, although a successful sovereign bankruptcy procedure would
reduce the high costs of default to sovereign debtors and their citizens, it
might so change present arrangements as to “dry up the sovereign bond
market completely.”
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